Canada - NWS #6? ( Archived) (29)

Canada has not maintained and positioned weapons of mass destruction since 1984 as of 1998 and has signed treaties repudiating possession of them. Canada ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1930 and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1970, but still sanctions contributions to American military programs.

With the American emphasis on nuclear deterrence following the Soviet Union's atom bomb test, Canadian cooperation with the US required the alignment of Canadian doctrine with defensive elements of American nuclear weapons doctrine.

The first US nuclear weapon came to Canada in 1950 when the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command stationed 11 model 1561 Fat Man atomic bombs at Goose AFB, Newfoundland and Labrador.

From 1963 to 1984, Canada fielded a total of four tactical nuclear weapons systems which deployed several hundred nuclear warheads.

Throughout the Cold War, Canada was closely aligned with defensive elements of United States programs in both NORAD and NATO. In 1964 Canada sent its White Paper on Defence to U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to ensure he would not, “find anything in these references contrary to any views may have expressed.”

Canada withdrew three of the four nuclear-capable weapons systems by 1972. The single system retained, the AIR-2 Genie delivered 1.5 kiloton of force, and was designed to strike enemy aircraft as opposed to ground targets, and may not qualify as a weapon of mass destruction given its limited yield.

Canada continues to promote peaceful nuclear technology exemplified by the CANDU reactor. Unlike most designs, the CANDU does not require enriched fuel, and in theory is therefore much less likely to lead to the development of weaponized missile fuel. However, like all power reactor designs, CANDU reactors produce and use plutonium in their fuel rods during normal operation (roughly 50% of the energy generated in a CANDU reactor comes from the in situ fission of plutonium created in the uranium fuel), and this plutonium could be used in a nuclear explosive if separated and converted to metallic form (albeit only as reactor-grade plutonium, and therefore of limited military usefulness). Accordingly, CANDU reactors, like most power reactors in the world, are subject to safeguards under the United Nations which prevent possible diversion of plutonium. CANDU reactors are designed to be refuelled while running, which makes the details of such safeguards significantly different from other reactor designs. The end result, however, is a consistent and internationally accepted level of proliferation risk.

A common accusation is that India used Canadian reactors to produce plutonium for weapons. India owns two licensed CANDU reactors and began nuclear weapons tests shortly after they became operational in 1972. However, international observers have concluded that no plutonium was diverted from the safeguarded CANDU reactors.[citation needed] The plutonium for the initial bombs came from the older CIRUS reactor built by Canada (see Nuclear Weapons above), but the material for India's most recent nuclear test, Operation Shakti, is thought to come from the locally-designed Dhruva reactor. India has also built a number of reactors, not under IAEA safeguards, that were derived from the CANDU design and are used for power generation. These may also be used for plutonium production.

Canada has volunteered to help destroy some of the leftover chemical weapons of the USSR. There is also talk of taking Soviet nuclear fuel and using it as fuel in CANDU reactors, but this is controversial.

Canada possesses 8% of the world's uranium resources, but currently produces roughly 22% of the uranium sold on the global market. Most of this uranium comes from the McArthur River Mine in Saskatchewan, the most productive uranium mine in the world. Uranium extraction is expected to increase significantly in 2013 with the opening of the Cigar Lake Mine. Given 572,000 metric tons of known uranium resources (U3O8), Canada will continue to play a significant role in meeting world demand. Canadian industry is also active in the refining and conversion processes. Cameco Corporation's refinery at Blind River is the world's largest, and refines both domestic and foreign U3O8 into UO3. Cameco's conversion facility at Port Hope represents 25% of the western world's uranium hexafluoride (UF6) conversion capacity, and is the only commercial supplier of fuel-grade natural UO2, used to fabricate fuel bundles for CANDUs around the world. 85% of Canada's uranium production is exported. Canada is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and concludes bilateral safeguards agreements with customer countries as a precondition for nuclear trade.